The correlations between oil-price movements and GDPjluctuations are investigatedfor the United States, Canada, Japan, Germany (West), France, the United Kingdom, and Norway. The responses to price increases and decreases are allowed to be asymmetric. Bivariate con-elations as well as partial wrrelations within a reduced-form macroeconomic model are considered. We correlations with oil-price increases are negative and signijcant for most countries, but positive for Norway, whose oil-producing sector is large relative to the economy as a whole. lbe correlations with oil-price decreases are mostly positive, but significant only for the United States and Canada. Most countries show evidence of asymmetric effects, with Norway again as an exception.
INTRODUCTION
The negative correlation between oil prices and real output seems, by now, to have been accepted as an empirical fact. Hamilton (1983) demonstrated both the significance and the robustness of this finding on U.S. data both before and after the "oil crisis" of the 1970s. Gisser and Goodwin (1986) reportecd similar results. International data were examined by Darby (1982) and Burbidge and Harrison (1984) , who found that similar correlations could be found for other industrialized countries, although to a somewhat lesser degree than for the United States. An extensive analysis of the price shocks of the 1970s has been provided by Bruno and Sachs (1985) .
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The period since the 1970s has provided time to reflect on the possible mechanisms at work as well as further data, particularly in the form of the large price decline in 1985-86 and subsequent fluctuations. A survey of the various mechanisms studied can be found, for example, in Mork (1994) . The early analyses focused on aggregate effects, such as the implied transfer of wealth from oil-importing to oil-exporting countries and the negative effect of oil price increases on the demand for labor and capital. A more recent aggregate analysis is the one by Kim and Loungani (1992) , who simulate the effects of oil price fluctuations in a real business cycle model. Other recent works, such as Davis (1987) , Loungani (1986) , and Hamilton (1988) have focused instead on the effects of oil price changes on the microeconomic realignment among sectors and the short-run misallocations that may accompany such realignments. Lee et al. (1993) focus on the environment in which oil price changes take place and claim, on the basis of U.S. data, that oil price shocks have larger business-cycle effects when they are unexpected and large relative to the recent fluctuations in oil prices. Ferderer (1993) , on the other hand, argues-from the theoretical analysis of Bemanke (1983) and an empirical analysis of U.S. data-that the driving force is not the oil price movements themselves, but the uncertainty caused by a disruption in the oil market.
The oil price declines since 1985 have provided the data needed to test whether the macroeconomic effects of oil price increases and decreases are symmetric, that is, whether oil price declines are as beneficial as oil price increases of the same magnitude are detrimental to economic activity. Tatom (1988 Tatom ( , 1993 used U.S. data to test the hypothesis that the effects are symmetric and was unable to reject it. A study by one of the present authors (Mork, 1989) , however, reaches the opposite conclusion. It confirms Hamilton's (1983) results by finding that a strong, negative correlation between oil price increases and the growth of Gross National Product (GNP) for the United States persists when the sample is extended beyond the 1985-86 oil price decline. However, the correlation with price declines is significantly different and not significantly different from zero.
The present paper extends these findings to six other industrialized countries, namely, the Japan, Germany (West), France, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Norway. These countries vary considerably in the degree to which their economies depend on oil as an input and to which they are dependent on foreign oil. Two of the countries, the United Kingdom and Norway, switched from a position of net importer to net exporter of oil in the 197Os, and Canada has moved back and forth between these positions over time.
The paper seeks answers to three empirical questions:
1. Does the negative correlation persist in data series extending through 1992?
2.
Is the correlation pattern the same for price decreases as for increases?
3.
Does the correlation pattern vary from country to country?
The answer to the first of these questions provides a clue as to whether the correlation between oil shocks and business cycles in the 1970s reflected a structural relationship or a historical coincidence. The answer to the second question should shed some light on the nature of the structural mechanisms at work. The answer to the third question should provide further information on these mechanisms because the different structural features of the various countries may have affected the mechanisms. For example, there may be reason to expect the effects to differ between net oil importing and net oil exporting camtries.
Our main findings may be summarized as follows. The negative correlation between oil price increases and growth in Gross Domestic Prodtrct (GDP) is present and significant for most of the countries studied for data extending through 1992. However, we find strong indications of asymmetry in the effects. Furthermore, the results differ somewhat from country to country. The results are strongest for the United States, where oil price increases as well as decreases seem to hurt the business-cycle development. Japan also shows a significantly negative effect of oil price increases, but not of decreases. The case of Norway stands out in the sense that this country's economy seems to be buoyed by oil price increases and depressed by price declines. For a country of 4 million people that currently produces more than 2 million barrels of crude oil per day, this result is hardly surprising.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines a structural framework for analysing oil price shocks. The purpose of this exercise is not to provide a new theoretical model, but to suggests ways to motivate tble econometric model used in this paper. The third section presents the empirical implementation of this model. The fourth section presents the results and tb.e fifth section the conclusions. Kim and Loungani (1992) analyze the role of energy shocks in a fairly standard real business cycle model, that is, a dynamic, neoclassical model with no price and wage rigidities.
MODELING OIL PRICE SHOCKS
Energy enters the model as a third input t,o production, next to labor and capital. Business cycles are generated b,y exogenous oil price shocks as well as productivity shocks. Competitive equilibrium in this model determines real GDP, employment, real wages, and real interest rates.
Treating energy as only an input to production may be reasonablle as long as the country is a net importer of energy. In order to fit different situations, the model by Kim and Loungani could be extended to include two sectors, of which one would be energy producing. Such a model could motivate an empirical specification where GDP or its growth rate is among the endogenous variables. Other endogenous variables include employment (or its close companion, the unemployment rate), and relative prices such as the real wage and the real interest rate. If the price of oil is determined outside; the country it may enter as an exogenous variable, as may world export demand for non-energy goods. Productivity shocks are exogenous variables, too, but unobservable ones and thus relegated to the error terms. The magnitude and direction of the effects of oil price shocks would depend on whether the country is a net importer or exporter of oil. The ratio of energy imports to GDP may be entered as an additional variable to indicate this effect; and the relationship between oil price movements and GDP growth may differ from country to country for the same reason.
Because this model ignores the frictions that may arise in the transfer of resources between the various sectors of the economy, it would predict the effects of oil price increases and decreases to be symmetric as a first approximation.
However, if such frictions are introduced in the model, as in the alternative real-business-cycle model of Hamilton (1988) , the symmetry disappears. The benefits of an oil price decline then would be smaller than the damages caused by a price increase of similar magnitude, and it even couEd be negative. Kim and Loungani (1992) further suggest that a real-business-cycle model may understate the effects of oil price fluctuations because oil shocks may interact with wage and price rigidity to cause larger unemployment effects. Such rigidities also may cause asymmetries if wages or prices are rigid in the downward direction, but not upward. In the simple, one-sector model of Gil,bert and Mork (1986) , wages are assumed to be nominally rigid and the price level to follow standard unit costs. The effect of an oil price increase on GDP is
( 1 where u is the (short-run) direct elasticity of substitution between oil and labor, s, is the cost share of capital in the production of gross output, and e is, the value ratio of oil imports to GDP. This effect is negative provided u < l/( l-s,J.
If, in this model, we assume that the nominal wage is rigid only in the downward direction, the above formula holds only for oil price increases. For oil price declines, the demand for labor would increase similarly, but the labor provided o + q < l/(1 -sK) , which turns out to be the condition for tbe downward wage rigidity to be binding when the price of oil increases.
Suppose now that tbis model is embedded in a two-sector model, so that tbe results in (1) and (2) bold for Ys, the GDP contribution of the energy using sector, provided the ratio e is replaced by the value ratio of total energy input to tbe GDP contribution in tbe energy using sector. Suppose furthermore that the energy producing sector can he modeled analogously.
Letting YE denote the GDP contribution of that sector, we then can derive expressions like (1) and (;!) for 9 and&. These elasticities will hotb be positive, but for tbe same reasons as above we can assumers < fi. Finally, let es denote the value ratio of total energy use to total GDP and e, the value ratio of domestic energy production to total GDP. Then, tbe effects on GDP of oil price increases and decreases may be expressed by tbe elasticities
Clearly, tbe elasticities for oil price increases and decreases will, in general, be different. Tbe elasticity with respect to an oil price increase is likely to be negative unless the energy sector makes up a large portion of the economy. The same can he said ahout the elasticity with respect to an oil price decrease; but tbis elasticity is likely to he smaller in absolute value. In fact, if tbe elasticities of labor supply for the two sectors are small enough and the domestic energy sector large enough, it is entirely possible that Y-he positive at the same time as P' is negative.
If the country imports all its oil, so that eD = 0, tbis case is unlikely to arise in the two-sector model outlined here.
However, if the model is extended to a multi-sector model, with more friction for resource transfers across sectors, it is entirely possible that the loss of output due to reallocation could outweigh the gains from an oil-price decline, even if tbe country imports all its oil.
Besides providing a rudimentary reason for expecting asymmetric effects of oil prices and decreases, tbe nominal rigidity model motivates tbe inclusion of tbe price level as an additional variable in the empirical model.
We ought to add that seemingly asymmetric effects of oil price fluctuations may be due to asymmetric policy responses. For example, price increases may he countered with anti-inflationary policies, which may have negative real effects, while price declines may not trigger inflationary policies. We suspect that such an anti-inflationary policy bias may exist in some of the countries we study, such as Germany.
EMPIRICALIMPLEMENTATION
In addition to the procedures outlined in the preceding section, the literature suggests a number of ways to model the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks. This variety, along with the difficulties involved in estimating directly the models we outline, suggests that empirical estimation he based on a relatively unrestricted econometric specification. For these reasons, we use a reduced-form approach. Like the leading previous studies, we seek a model formulation that is consistent with a wide range of empirical approaches while permitting us to test the hypotheses we are interested in. The importance of the theoretical analysis of tbe last section lies in its suggestions ahout hypotheses to test and variables to include.
As a first step, we analyze the bivariate correlations between oil-price changes and GDP growth. In order to allow for the richest possible dynamics, we carry out this analysis in a fashion similar to Hamilton's Granger causality tests, that is, by estimating a regression equation with GDP growth as the variable on the left and lagged values of GDP growth and oil price changes on tbe right. However, we extend this approach two ways. First, in order to test for asymmetries, we enter real oil price increases and decreases as separate variables.
Second, based on Hamilton's findings that the price of o:il is exogenous with respect to real GDP growth, we also include the contemporaneous changes in the price of oil. Preliminary investigations suggested we include lags of five quarters. Thus, our bivariate estimation equation for each country is Here, yI denotes the growth rate in real GDP. The variable p,' equals the growth rate in the real price of oil when this growth rate is positive, and otherwise 0. Similarly, p; equals the oil-price growth rate when it is negative and is otherwise 0.
With this specification, we can carry out conventional F-tests of tbe following tbree hypotheses:
1. Oil price increases have no effect on real GDP growth: b,'= b;=... = b,'= 0.
2. Oil price decreases have no effect on real GDP growth: bi= b;= . ..= bi= 0.
3. The effects of oil price increases and decreases are symmetric:
b;=b,-,j = 0,1,...,5. We refer to this test as a test of pairwise equality of the coefficients.
Tbe bivariate correlations are of interest hecause they indicate whether and bow business cycles are correlated with events in the oil market. However, they tell little about the nature of the link. Hamilton (1983) was particularly careful to investigate whether oil prices and business cycles were driven jointly by some other underlying force. We find it at least as important to examine whether an apparent macroeconomic effect is a direct result of the oil-price change as opposed to an indirect effect of accompanying events. Thus, it may have been caused by policy responses to the price shock rather than the shock itself; it may occur via changes in export demand from trading partners whose economies were affected; or it may he the indirect result of a policy response in another country via this route.
We examine these possibilities by estimating the partial effects of oilprice changes within a reduced-form regression model that includes five-quarter distributed lags of a typical set of other macroeconomic variables in addition to tbe oil-price variables. 'Ibis approach is similar to that used by Hamilton (1983) ,. Burbidge and Harrison (1984), and Mork (1989) . Specifically, we extend tbe model in (4) as follows:
Here, x, is overall inflation, measured by the GDP deflator for all countries except the United Kingdom and Norway, for which the GDP deflator is heavily influenced by the price of oil. For these two countries, we used the Consumer Price Index as a substitute. i, is a short-term interest rate, except for Norway, for which no such series was available, so we used a long-term interest rate instead. Norwegian interest rates were subject to regulation, coupled with credit rationing, during a large part of the sample period. u, denotes tbe unemployment rate, and x, the growth rate of tbe industrial production index for tbe OECD area as a whole. Tbe latter variable is used as a proxy for exoge:nous export demand. Mork (1989) used the import price deflator for a similar purpose. However, we decided to follow Burbidge and Harrison (1984) in substituting tbis quantity index because it seems to represent business cycles in other countries more directly. when we tried to include both variables, the coefficients of the oil-price variables did not change.
These variables are all motivated by the models outlined in the second section. The last variable, e,, detined as the value ratio of energy imports to GDP, plays a somewhat different role. According to the theory, the magnitude of tbe effect of an oil price shock may be proportional to this variable. If we followed this logic, this variable should multiply tbe oil-price changes as an interaction effect in tbe model. We initially tried such a specification, but the resulting coefficients bad very large standard errors and did not appear to he informative. Thus, we introduce this variable linearly only. However, it should be noted that an interactive effect is introduced indirectly in that the effects of oil price changes are allowed to differ from country to country, and the countries included vary greatly as to their net export position for oil.
Since our allowance for asymmetric responses introduces a nonlinearity in our model, it cannot be inverted by standard methods even if we bad estimated reduced-form equations for all of the variables. Furthermore, generating country-specific predictions of the OECD industrial-production index, which is what we would do if we inverted country-specific VAR-models, seems a little strained to us. Thus, our model is not a true VAR model or even an equation from one; however, we do interpret our equation as a reduced-form model of GDP fluctuations.
All variables except for the unemployment rate, the interest rate and the oil import share were specified as annualized growth rates, defined as 400 times tbe log changes of tbe respective quarterly level figures. Tbe source for all data except tbe oil-price series is the OECD Main Economic Indicators (MEI), with tbe exception of Norway, where supplementary data (in part unpublished) were obtained directly from Statistics Norway. The latter include data from the Quarterly National Accounts and the unemployment rate as derived from a monthly survey of individuals. Most of the data were seasonally adjusted by the respective sources. We adjusted tbe remaining series by means of the seasonal adjustment procedure in the program system TROLL. Tbe starting dates vary from country to country and from series to series. We decided to use the same estimation period for all countries, which, considering lags and firstdifferencing, defined our estimation period as 1967:3 -1992:4. Tbe choice of oil-price variables was more difficult and also more important. Historically, national oil prices have heen influenced heavily by price-control schemes in tbe United States and Canada, by high and varying taxes on petroleum products in Europe, and by the considerable fluctuations in exchange rates since 1972. Such considerations motivated Mork (1989) to construct a price-control corrected oil-price index for tbe United States. Burbidge and Harrison, however, used tbe dollar world price of crude oil as a common indicator of the world market disturbances that affect all countries. We decided to take a middle route by using the world price of oil for all countries, but converted into each respective country's currency by means of the market exchange rate. As our measure of the world price, we decided to use tbe price of Arabian Light crude oil (official prices through 1978:4, and spot prices thereafter). Tbe deflation of oil prices was done by the inflation indicator that we used for each country. Table 1 presents the results for the model specification (4) with only GDP growth and oil-price variables. The equations for the different countries were estimated simultaneously as a system of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). Table 1 is organized as follows. Tbe upper part shows the estimated coefficients for real oil price increases and decreases with standard errors in parentheses. Tbe sums of the coefficients of each of the respective variables are reported as well, as rough indicators of tbe total magnitudes of the effects. Tbe lower part of the table presents the results of tbe three tests listed after formula (4) in tbe text. Tbe results are presented in tbe form of p-values, in other words tbe probability of observing the actual or a higher F-value under the respective null hypotheses.
BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS
Tbe bottom of the table presents the estimates of tbe contemporaneous variancecovariance matrix of the residuals of our SUR system.
Tbe bivariate results show a general pattern of negative correlations hetween GDP growth and real oil price increases. This correlation is significant on tbe 10% level (at least borderline) for all countries except Canada. The low significance for Germany seems a little puzzling hecause the point estimates are similar to those of the United States and Japan. In a previous version of this paper, we obtained a similar level of significance for Germany as well, but we then used growth rates in GNP rather than GDP as the activity variable. We suspect that GDP for Germany is measured less accurately than GNP and that tbe lack of significance is caused by the measurement errors.
Tbe United Kingdom shows tbe same negative correlation as the net oilimporting countries. Norway, on the other band, shows a significantly positive correlation, which is not surprising, given tbe large relative magnitude of the oil sector in the Norwegian economy. It should be noted, perhaps, that Norway did not hecome a net exporter of oil until late 1975, so that it was a net importer at the time of tbe 1973-74 price shock. However, at this time investment projects in tbe North Sea were in an early phase, and these activities were most likely stimulated by tbe dramatic price rise.
Tbe correlations with oil price decreases are quite different, however.
Tbe general pattern seems to be a positive correlation, which would suggest that oil-price declines are associated with subsequent declines in overall growth. However, by and large, this correlation is not significant. An interesting exception is Canada, where the correlations also are positive, but significant. In part tbis difference may be explained by the size of the Canadian petroleum sector. However, the corresponding correlations are essentially zero for the United Kingdom and positive, but far from significant for Norway. Although the point estimates indicate that the Norwegian economy suffered some economic decline after the dive in oil prices in 1985-86, the bivariate correlation is by no means significant. This lack of significance may be due to the substantial residual variance for Norway, which we attribute in part to measurement errors in tbe quarterly GDP figures. However, it remains true that the bivariate correlations do not reveal any clear picture of whether oil-prices declines unambiguously help or hurt an economy. Tbe overall differences between the estimated coefficients for oil price increases and decreases, respectively, are suggestive of asymmetric effects. Formal tests of asymmetry result in different results for different coumries. Significance at the 5% level is found for the United States, Japan and Canada. For Germany, France and the United Kingdom the significance level has be relaxed to 15-20 96. For Norway, rejection of symmetry is not obtained even with this lax criterion. Table 2 presents the results for the oil variables when the other macroeconomic variables are included in the equations as in formula (5) Tbe main conclusion from Table 2 is that tbe oil-price-GDP correlation generally stands out as even more significant in the multivariate model than in the bivariate model. First we notice that the negative correlation between oil price increases and GDP growth is preserved for all countries when all the other variables are added, again with Norway as tbe exception. The significance is weakened somewhat for Germany compared to tbe bivariate case, but improved for France and Canada.
MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
Regarding magnitudes, tbe negative effects from oil price increases are quite high (and significant) for the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. For Japan, it is worth noting that the sum of coefficient is somewhat smaller (in absolute value) than for the United States. Immediately, this result. may he surprising given Japan's extreme reliance on imported oil as an energy source. However, as is well known, the Japanese economy survived the second oil shock in 1979-80 much better than the first one in 1973-74. Whatever the reason for tbis improvement, it contributes to the relatively low estimated value of the Japanese correlation.
Turning to the effects of oil price decreases, Table 2 shows that the multivariate regressions yield positive and significant coefficients for the United States, indicating that U.S. economic growth is hurt by oii price decreases as well as increases. This result is in line with those obtained by Mork (1989) . Furthermore, Table 2 shows that the significant positive correlation for Canada from the bivariate case is preserved in the multivariate model and also that Germany now may be included in the same group, at least with a borderline significance on the 10% level. For the remaining countries, the effects of oil price declines on GDP growth remain ambiguous, although the significance of the estimated coefficients has generally improved compared to the univariate regressions.
Whereas only the United States, Japan and Canada showed significant evidence of asymmetry in the bivariate model, this result may be extended to include Germany in the multivariate case if we again are willing to accept borderline significance on the 10% level. From Table 2 it is seen that the evidence of asymmetric effects of oil price increases and decreases for the two North-American countries now is significant on the 2 46 level, while Japan comes close with 3 %.
CONCLUSIONS
We started this paper with three empirical questions:
1.
Does the negative correlation between oil-price increases and GDP growth persist in data series extending through 1992?
2.
Is tbe correlation pattern tbe same for price decreases as for increases?
3.
Does tbe correlation pattern vary from country to country?
The first question clearly can he answered in the affirmative.. Tbe analysis of our data, which include the period following the 1990 unrest {in the Persian Gulf, does not change the conventional view. Tbe correlation i,s not quite significant for all countries, most notably Germany; but we tend to attribute this lack of significance to errors in the measurement of GDP (as opposed to GNP) for that country.
The correlation patterns are not the same for price increases and decreases, however. For most countries, tbe coefficients of oil-price decreases tend to be of the opposite sign as the corresponding coefficients for price increases, indicating that oil-price increases have adverse effects on tbe business cycle. For many countries, these coefficients are not significantly different from zero. Perhaps surprisingly, however, their absolute magnitudes are similar to those of tbe coefficients for price increases. For most countries, the asymmetry is significant.
The asymmetry results are clearest for tbe United States, but Japan, Canada, and the United Kingdom follow significant patterns, and Germany and France are not too dissimilar. We conclude that asymmetry in the effects of oil price fluctuations is a reasonably robust empirical finding.
Tbe third question also can he answered in the affirmative, although perhaps not as strongly as could have heen expected. 'Ibe vulnerability to oil price increases seems to he most clearly established for the United States,. even though this country is less dependent on imported oil than countries like Germany, France, and Japan. Furthermore, the United Kingdom is surprisingly similar to the net oil-importing countries. However, Norway, which is a much larger net exporter relative to the size of the country, behaves substantially differently. As expected, the Norwegian economy benefits significantly from oil price increases. It also seems to be hurt by price declines, but this finding is somewhat less significant. However, it seems clear that a country's net export position for oil influences the oil-priceGDP correlation substantially provided the domestic oil sector is large enough relative to the size of the economy.
Overall, our results seem to leave no doubt that oil-price fluctuations must be reckoned with as a significant force in the shaping of business cycles of the leading market economies. This force must he expected to persist as long as oil remains an important energy source.
